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Abstract
The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with
accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic concep-
tion fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in par-
ticular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes
theoretical progress can be a maer of new theories ‘latching beer onto
unobservable reality’ in a way that need not be a maer of new know-
ledge. Recognising this further dimension of theoretical progress is partic-
ularly significant for understanding scientific realism, since realism is nat-
urally construed as the claim that science makes theoretical progress. Some
prominent realist positions (regarding fundamental physics, in particular)
are best understood in terms of commitment to theoretical progress that
cannot be equated with accumulation of scientific knowledge.
Keywords: Bird; Newton; Scientific knowledge; Scientific progress; Scientific
realism
1 Introduction
What is scientific progress? A simple question. Or, a question that is simple to
state, at least. Bird (2007) thinks the question also has a simple answer: science
progresses by cumulating knowledge.
Science (or some particular scientific field or theory) makes progress pre-
cisely when it shows the accumulation of scientific knowledge; an episode
in science is progressive when at the end of the episode there is more know-
ledge than at the beginning. (64)
This sums up the epistemic conception of scientific progress. It is intuitive, straight-
forward, and has a venerable history. But it is too simple! I will examine and
expose its shortcomings specifically in relation to theoretical progress, showing
how theoretical progress can in important ways transcend scientific knowledge.
∗Forthcoming in Synthese.
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Given a close conceptual connection between theoretical progress and scientific
realism this has significant repercussions for our understanding of scientific real-
ism, too.1
What is theoretical progress in science, more specifically? By ‘theoretical’
progress, as I use the term, I mean the kind of progress that goes beyond the
progress that practically everyone—including instrumentalists or empiricists—
associates with science. As such, theoretical progress is naturally characterised,
ab initio, in contrastive terms, in relation to various specific ways for science to
progress which do not count as ‘theoretical’ in this sense. For example, one non-
theoretical aspect of progress has to do with the improving empirical accuracy
of theoretical representations in science.2 Although it is not a straightforward
maer to say what this kind of progress exactly amounts to, one influential and
powerful idea is to think of it in terms of progress towards (complete) empirical
adequacy. (van Fraassen, 1980) There are also various forms of progress in the
‘instrumental’ features of science: in addition to the development of scientific
instruments, one can think of new mathematical and computational methods,
for instance.3 There are various examples of such broadly pragmatic progress,
corresponding to all kinds of useful cognitive scaolding, from the development
of a powerful notation (e.g. Feynman diagrams), to a heuristically useful mode of
presentation (e.g. acceleration in response to fictitious Coriolis force). ‘Theoret-
ical progress’, as I use the term, denotes scientific progress that is extra-empirical,
extra-instrumental, extra-pragmatic. It is whatever progress scientists make (or
possibly could make) with theories, going beyond the progress science exhibits
in its empirical, instrumental, or pragmatic aspects. Scientific realists maintain
that science actually exhibits also theoretical progress.
With theoretical progress thus understood, we can ask: what exactly is it?4
What exactly does the realist claim amount to? I will answer these questions by
analysing the notion of theoretical progress, aiming to characterise it in a way
that respects our intuitions and encompasses important senses of extra-empirical
and extra-instrumental progress. Correspondingly, as an upshot, I will character-
1Rowboom (2010) also denies that the epistemic view provides a necessary condition for sci-
entific progress. More specifically, Rowboom denies that a progress-inducing scientific devel-
opment must be justified; hence he denies that these developments must be knowledge-inducing,
since knowledge entails justification. (Against Bird (2007), Rowboom (2010, pp. 242-243) also con-
siders the possibility of progress with justified true beliefs that do not amount to knowledge. See
also the exchange in Rowboom (2008) and Bird (2008) on the constitutive vs. instrumental role of
justification.) My argument, by contrast, focuses on progressive developments in science, involving
false theories, that are justified but nevertheless need not yield accumulation of knowledge sui-
cient for grounding the progress.
2‘Theoretical representation’ is an umbrella term for all types of theories, models, simulations,
et cetera, that can be construed as representing the world. From now on I just use ‘theory’, for
short.
3See Douglas (2014) for the importance of broadly ‘instrumental’ progress in increased capacity
to intervene, control, and predict the empirical world.
4Or, we can ask ‘what would count as theoretical progress?’, disregarding the realist issue
whether science actually makes any theoretical progress.
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ise scientific realism in new ways—with scientific realism construed as claiming
that science actually makes some kind of theoretical progress. I will do all this in
the context of the epistemic conception of progress, pointing to the limits of this
conception in relation to theoretical progress in particular, arguing that it fails to
fully capture some strong intuitions about theoretical progress and, correspond-
ingly, about realism.5 (Whether or not the epistemic conception of progress fully
or naturally captures other aspects of scientific progress does not concern me
here.)
The next section presents a natural intuition about theoretical progress, that
we want to respect despite its variance with the epistemic conception (reviewed
in §3). The rest of the paper then spells out, refines, and defends this intuition
and an associated analysis of scientific realism.
2 An intuition about theoretical progress
Intuitively, one undeniable dimension of theoretical progress has to do with how
well our theories latch onto unobservable reality : the beer contact our theoretical
assumptions make with reality, the beer. The intuitive idea of ‘latching onto’
reality is a bit vague and metaphorical. Don’t worry; stick with me. I will elucidate
it in due course, in §4.
Intuitive, also, theoretical progress cannot just be a maer of theories making
beer contact with the unobservable reality, however. We do not make theoretical
progress simply by adopting a new theory that latches beer onto unobservable
reality, since it would not count as theoretical progress if we adopted such a the-
ory on some arbitrary grounds—merely accidentally latching beer onto reality.
It would not count as progress if such theory somehow emerged as the leading
contender by sheer luck—as an outcome of irrational, unreliable pseudo-scientific
theorising, say, without appropriate evidential support. (Bird, 2007: 66–7) Intuit-
ively, then, theoretical progress is also partly a maer of a theory being suitably
supported by evidence.
We can succinctly capture the two intuitions above as follows:
TP Science makes theoretical progress if a theoretical representation that is
beer supported by scientific evidence latches beer onto unobservable
5In appealing to ‘our intuitions’ about (theoretical) progress I am not claiming or aiming to
capture a ‘folk’ concept of scientific progress (cf. Mizrahi and Buckwalter, 2014). Rather, I take
‘theoretical progress’ to be a term of art in well-established philosophical debates about scientific
realism and how scientific theorising relates to reality. In the context of these debates the notion
of ‘theoretical’ progress, and its contrast to e.g. ‘empirical’ or ‘instrumental’ progress, serves to de-
lineate positions that philosophers engaged in those debates care about. Our (viz. philosophers’)
intuitions about (theoretical) progress maer to the extent they can, for example, point towards
novel philosophical positions worth investigating and defending in the context of those debates.
Also, along with many other authors I view philosophical debates about scientific progress as in-
herently normative, involving judgments about values or aims of ‘good science’ that cannot be
reduced to the content of folk intuitions about progress (cf. Niiniluoto 2011; Rowboom 2015).
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reality.6
The rest of this paper spells out, refines, and defends the idea that TP captures a
dimension of theoretical progress. There are three things in particular to clarify
with respect to TP and scientific realism. It is noteworthy, first of all, that TP
does not characterise theoretical progress as an epistemic maer: TP does not
speak of theoretical knowledge. One may find this puzzling: isn’t the notion
of theoretical progress intimately connected to (or even identical to) the notion
of accumulating theoretical knowledge? Section §3 discusses what is right and
what is wrong with this reaction. Secondly, we need to clarify what is meant
by ‘latching beer onto’ reality (§4). Finally, having done all that, we need to
sharpen our grasp on scientific realism by aending to the connection between
theoretical progress and scientific realism (§5).
3 Theoretical progress and knowledge
3.1 The epistemic conception of progress versus TP
According to the epistemic conception there is progress in science ‘precisely when
it shows accumulation of knowledge.’ (Bird 2007: 64) With this in mind, theoret-
ical progress more specifically is naturally equated with accumulation of theory-
mediated knowledge about the unobservable.7
The epistemic conception of progress is intuitive and aractive. Also, it is
natural to think that theoretical progress, more specifically, should be intimately
linked to accumulating scientific knowledge. For isn’t theoretical progress pre-
theoretically a maer of learning new facts about the unobservable world? Isn’t
it about geing to know through well-functioning scientific theorising what the
unobservable reality is like? And in as far as scientific realism can be construed as
standing for the idea that science makes theoretical progress, doesn’t the laer
notion necessarily incorporate an epistemological aspect, just as realism does?
Such intuitions support the equation of progress with accumulation of true sci-
entific beliefs that qualify as knowledge.8 It is also suggested by many realist
writings, which oen thus relate progress to knowledge about the unobservable,
as e.g. Leplin (1984: 2) does: “What realists do share in common are the convic-
tions that scientific change is, on balance, progressive, and that science makes
possible knowledge of the world beyond its accessible, empirical manifestations.”
6TP only gives a suicient condition for theoretical progress, leaving it open whether there
are other forms of such progress not captured by this characterisation. I’ll explain my reasons for
leaving it open in this way in §6.
7This is more or less how Bird understands it, too. (2007: 79) Many others have in the same
vein construed ‘cognitive progress’ of science in terms of accumulation of knowledge, including
also knowledge about the current limits of science, for example.
8For a true belief to qualify as knowledge it needs to be epistemically acceptable, which ac-
cording to the consensus requires a justification of some sort and/or being produced by a reliable
mechanism.
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But natural though this equation is, it is too simple. Even if much of scientific
progress can be captured as accumulation of some kind of knowledge, I will now
argue that it is possible to have theoretical progress that does not amount to
accumulation of knowledge. Therefore, a comprehensive conception of progress
must be broader than the epistemic conception.
My argument will focus on TP. We have already noted that TP does not say
anything at all about scientific knowledge, in stark contrast with the epistemic
conception of progress. According to TP, theoretical progress can be a maer of
beer empirically supported theories latching beer onto reality (in a way that
is not accidental). I will argue that there need not be accumulation of knowledge
to accompany such progress in the way required by the epistemic conception.9
Let me begin by oering a purely conceptual reason for thinking that the epi-
stemic conception puts too much weight on knowledge. ‘Progress’, in general, is a
result-oriented, evaluative notion that applies to a positive achievement. In con-
nection with science, our theories can (in principle, at least) represent correctly
aspects of unobservable reality, and this can be regarded as a positive achieve-
ment (in as as far as it really is an achievement and not a mere happenstance).
‘Theoretical progress’, then, is naturally regarded as taking place if our theories
are doing beer in this way—if our theories are geing beer at representing the
unobservable. But progress thus characterised makes no mention of knowledge;
it is therefore not primarily an epistemic maer. (It is an epistemic maer only
in the sense that accepted theories must be suitably supported by evidence.)
Take, for example, a constructive empiricist. She can agree both that our the-
ories purportedly represent unobservable reality, and that theories can do beer
or worse in this respect, even though she takes ‘the aim’ of science to be the pro-
duction of empirically adequate theories, and she thinks that we are never in a
position to know how well our theories latch onto unobservable reality. An em-
piricist can admit that, for all we know, science may or may not make theoretical
progress (in addition to progress towards empirical adequacy), even though our
knowledge about the world is limited to its observable features.10 (Or she could
say that even if science makes theoretical progress, we are never rationally com-
pelled to believe it.) So, there is a sense in which de facto theoretical progress
seems compatible even with constructive empiricism. But this could not be so if
the notion of ‘theoretical progress’ was exhausted by the epistemic conception
9One might think that there is always known empirical progress accompanying TP, since the
characterisation of TP requires that the new theory has beer empirical support than the preced-
ing theories. But this is too quick: beer empirical support need not be a maer of increasing
empirical adequacy. It can also be a maer of seeing how the same observable phenomena beer
fit our changing theoretical representations of the unobservable reality. For example, a single con-
sistent theory that captures certain phenomena is empirically beer supported than a mutually
inconsistent conjunction of two theories that collectively capture the exactly same phenomena.
10The distinction between observable and unobservable features of the world has been drawn
in dierent ways in the realism debate. For the present discussion nothing much hangs on this, as
the kind of theoretical progress I am concerned with has to do with features of the world that are
undeniably unobservable. (Cf. van Fraassen 2003)
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according to which theoretical progress entails accumulation of theory-mediated
knowledge about the unobservable world.
The intelligibility of theoretical progress that thus transcends scientific know-
ledge indicates that such progress need not be an epistemic maer. Having said
that, I think we would do well to hang onto the idea that the notion of theoretical
progress is closely connected to scientific realism. We can do this by incorpor-
ating into our analysis of theoretical progress a minimal epistemic requirement :
it seems reasonable to require that for science to exhibit progress it must be in
principle possible to know about the progress made by reflecting on the nature of
scientific enquiry, empirical evidence, theory-change, etc. This requirement se-
cures the possibility of realism, in case science as a maer of fact is progressive,
and it is enough to render theoretical progress incompatible with empiricism, if
the empiricist denies the possibility of knowing whether there actually is theor-
etical progress. Still, this notion remains independent of the question whether
we actually do know of such progress or not. Whether or not there is theoretical
progress still need not be a primarily epistemic maer.
Thinking about ‘theoretical progress’ as a result-oriented, evaluative notion
thus shows how it is only epistemic in a broad sense; it is not primarily concerned
with knowledge. Next I will discuss how the epistemic conception of progress
furthermore turns out to be unduly restrictive, since we can easily conceive of
progressive theoretical developments that actually do not exhibit a pertinent kind
of accumulation of knowledge.
3.2 The epistemic conception and the grounding question
Since knowledge entails truth, accumulation of scientific knowledge requires ac-
cumulation of known truths. I will now argue that the notion of progress must be
broader than accumulation of knowledge since we can conceive of ways in which
theories can improve as per TP, without a corresponding accumulation of known
truths. (Correspondingly, I will argue (in §5) that the realist idea that science
really does exhibit theoretical progress turns out to be broader than the notion
that there really is accumulation of theoretical knowledge.)
We can pose the following question—call it the Grounding estion—to the
epistemic conception of progress. Since knowledge entails truth, accumulation
of scientific knowledge requires accumulation of scientific truths. But where in
science can we locate the truths that thus ground theoretical progress?11
What makes the Grounding estion pressing is the fact that our theories
and their ‘components’—however these are construed—rarely aain full truth:
they are typically at best ‘approximately true’, or ‘partially true’, or ‘partially
veridical’ in some sense. But knowledge is grounded in truth simpliciter.12 So a
11estions similar to my Grounding estion have been asked about idealised models, for
example. See e.g. Elgin (2007), Jones (2013), Mizrahi (2012).
12The factivity of knowledge—that knowledge entails truth—is almost universally accepted plat-
itude about knowledge. There is, of course, a great deal of disagreement about the exact epistemic
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string of questions arises: Where in science are these progress-grounding exact
truths to be found? What are those truths about? How are those truths access-
ible to scientists who (according to our intuitions) make progress? The epistemic
conception must answer these questions in a way that respects our intuitions
about theoretical progress.
Bird (2007) recognises the need to respond to the Grounding estion. He
doesn’t consider it in its full generality, but only in connection with his evalu-
ation of the competing ‘semantic’ conception of progress, according to which
progress is a maer of increasing verisimilitude. More specifically, Bird evaluates
the following consideration that he moots on behalf of the semantic conception
of progress.
Theories are very oen at best only approximately true; they rarely aain
full truth. Since knowledge entails full truth, theories cannot be the objects
of knowledge. Consequently we cannot be accumulating knowledge in such
cases. Hence the cumulative knowledge account cannot explain the sense
in which our theories are geing beer. The verisimilitude account can
explain this and so is a beer account. (76)
Although Bird denies that there is a single notion of verisimilitude—informal
or otherwise—that could be used to characterise progress in general, he neverthe-
less argues that insofar as verisimilitude can be meaningfully used to describe
closeness to truth in some specific contexts, it provides a bridge to the relevant
true propositions that can be taken as objects of knowledge in the epistemic con-
ception.
If P is approximately true, then the proposition Q, that P is approximately
true, is itself true, not merely close to the truth. This is legitimate, since if
‘planets travel in ellipses’ is a scientific proposition, then so is ‘approxim-
ately, planets travel in ellipses’. Even if P is not true and so not knowable,
Q (Q = approximately P ) might well be knowable. (76)
Bird thus moves from an approximately true proposition (or theory) to a fully
true proposition concerning the approximation. Call this Bird’s move. It is a nat-
ural move to make; what should we make of it? It is critical to recognise that while
it is undeniably eective move to make in relation to some strictly false propos-
itions (e.g. ‘planets travel in ellipses’), it does not provide a general response to
the Grounding estion. A general response is needed, however, since according
to the epistemic conception of progress there are truths that ground theoretical
progress—truths that can be specified and known by scientists—whenever there
is theoretical progress in science.13
relation between knowledge and the relevant truth.
13Bird (2007) vacillates between dierent readings of the epistemic conception. Sometimes he
seems to equate progress with actual accumulation of knowledge (cf. quote at the beginning),
other times with the mere possibility of accumulation subject to ‘appropriate epistemic conditions
being met’ (74). It seems that the laer, weaker reading is the intended one. And the stronger
reading seems too strong, indeed; intuitively speaking theoretical progress should not be negated,
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Examination of the Grounding estion in connection with some intuitive
cases of theoretical progress will reveal the limits of the epistemic conception.14
According to Bird, science can progress with approximately true theoretical claims
(say, ‘P ’) as scientists learn new truths of the form ‘P is approximately true’,
thereby accumulating theoretical knowledge. This requires that in all cases of
progress scientists can learn truths—truths that constitute the progress made—
that can be thus stated on the basis of theories or propositions that are strictly
speaking false. This requirement, I will now argue, is implausible. There are cases,
first of all, in which scientists for epistemic reasons cannot obtain any clear sense
how a theory ‘approximates’ truth, and therefore they cannot obtain knowledge
of this sort (§3.3). Furthermore, there can also be cases of theoretical progress
where talk of ‘approximation’ seems inappropriate altogether, rendering Bird’s
move inapplicable (§3.4).15
3.3 Approaching the truth without accumulation of knowledge
We can think of various scenarios where theoretical knowledge cannot accumu-
late along with theoretical progress as per the epistemic conception. Consider
the following, for one. Assume we have a theory T which is ‘approximately true’
(in some contextually specified sense), and a successor theory T ′ that is (by the
same measure) even closer to the truth. Assume that the move from T to T ′ is
also suitably supported by evidence. Intuitively, this is theoretical progress. This
is captured by TP: the beer supported theory ‘latches beer onto reality’ in the
contextually specified sense of approximate truth.
But the move from T to T ′ need not increase our scientific knowledge so as
to capture the theoretical progress being made. The reason is simple: it may be
that science, although able to justify T ′ as our best theory, is unable to say how
T ′ approximates the truth. It may well be that only from the vantage point of
T ′’s successor, T ′′, we can get a handle on how T ′ approximates T ′′ (and hence
approaches the truth, on the assumption that T ′′ is closer to truth than T ′ and its
predecessor), even though the move toT ′ from its predecessor was progressive. In
more general and abstract terms, we can put the point as follows: it may be that
scientific method is reliable in producing beer theories in the relevant sense of
approximate truth, without providing scientists even roughly synchronous ability
to know the relevant truths about the approximation. Without a clear sense of
the way in which their theory approximates the truth, scientists are unable to
form any clear belief—never mind true belief that could qualify as knowledge—
for example, if scientists chose not to believe their theories regarding the unobservable for some
contingent (e.g. sociological) reasons. Bird says lile of the ‘appropriate epistemic conditions’,
however.
14No doubt that the Grounding estion can be answered in connection with many epistemolo-
gically well-founded propositions or theories concerning unobservable maers. The ellipse example
is a case in point, of course.
15Niiniluoto (2014) objects to Bird’s move, briefly but incisively, very much in the spirit the
objections developed in more detail below.
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about the theory being approximately true. Since the theory is not fully true, it
cannot in and of itself be an object of knowledge. And a truth of the form ‘the
theory is approximately true’ (in the relevant sense of ‘approximately true’) may
not be epistemically accessible to scientists at that time. So, theoretical progress
could be based on T ′’s factual approach to truth (in conjunction with suitable
evidential support), even if T ′’s approximate truth cannot for epistemic reasons
support accumulation of knowledge of the sort that captures this progress.16
Are we indulging in mere abstract speculation about an unrealistic conceptual
possibility? Certainly not. There are momentous precedents of this possibility in
actual science. As Barre (2008) carefully explains, Newtonian gravitation fur-
nishes an excellent illustration of this kind of progress in fundamental physics.
While the descriptions of the world aorded by Newtonian gravity (NG) and the
general theory of relativity (GTR) are radically at odds with one another, there
are also now well-understood descriptive similarities between the two theories
that provide a contextual, local sense in which NG can be construed as ‘approx-
imating’ GTR. But even if these descriptive similarities furnish a sense in which
NG as a maer of fact is ‘approximately true’, it is not a sense that Newton could
have grasped. It is only now, from the perspective of GTR, that we can get a
handle on this sense of approximation.
The dissimilarities between NG and GTR are striking and routinely used as a
reminder that a ‘radically false’ theory can be highly empirically adequate. Ac-
cording to NG a body of mass m is accelerated towards a body of mass M due
to a gravitational force that is inversely proportional to their distance r squared:
G
mM
r2
According to GTR, by contrast, the two bodies experience no force nor accelera-
tion, but rather follow a locally straight trajectory (geodesic) in curved spacetime.
Only if there is some non-gravitational force will the bodies divert from this nat-
ural, ‘unforced’ state of motion.
Despite this radical dissimilarity in their theoretical descriptions and funda-
mental ontology, NG and GTR also share significant (extra-empirical) similarities.
As Barre (2008) explains—following Malament’s work on the topic—our under-
standing of these similarities is in large part due to the post-GTR development
of a geometrized version of Newtonian gravitation (GNG), which is empirically
equivalent to NG but absorbs all the information about gravitational forces into
information about spacetime curvature so that gravitation is rendered a mani-
festation of spacetime curvature as in GTR. GNG furnishes a precise sense to
the inter-theoretic correspondence between NG and GTR, allowing for a detailed
16Could scientists perhaps be in a position to know that a theory is approximately true, even in
the absence of any knowledge of how it is approximately true? I am not sure. But doesn’t maer,
since such accumulation of knowledge, even if possible, does not comprise the intuitive sense of
theoretical progress at stake.
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comparison of the respective gravitational field equations, bringing out, for ex-
ample, the way in which for empty space the gravitational field equation of GTR
is extremely closely related to the field equation of NG (Ibid., 219). Similarly, GNG
furnishes a precise and theoretically rich sense in which NG is a non-relativistic
limit of GTR: the field equation of NG, in its geometrized form, is recovered at the
limit of Einstein’s field equations as relativistic eects vanish. Even the Euclidean
character of Newtonian space is determined by a well-defined classical limit of
GTR.17
Armed with a precise understanding of the correspondence between NG and
GTR it makes sense to refer to the features of NG that are preserved in GTR. Re-
flecting now on Newton’s epistemic situation, I fully agree with Barre’s verdict
that for a Newtonian realist who considers the theory to be ‘approximately true’,
the expected preservation [in future theories] of each of these features is
presumably part of what Newton should have wanted to mean in claiming
that his account of gravitation was at least approximately true. Of course,
Newton could not have meant anything so precise without knowing what
it would take to translate between descriptions in NG and descriptions in
subsequent theories, and he did not know this. (220, my emphasis)
But while Newton only had quite limited, partial knowledge of the way in which
his theory latches onto reality (as described by GTR), from our later vantage point
we can provide a rich and precise account of the empirical accuracy of Newton’s
theory in terms of some of its key features ‘approximating’ GTR. (This is how
work on the foundations of physics naturally gets involved in the realism debate!)
This example from the history of science shows concretely how Bird’s move
can fail with respect to truths of the form ‘T ′ is approximately true’. But is there
some other kind of pertinent increase in theoretical knowledge that necessarily
accompanies the progressive move from T to T ′? An advocate of the epistemic
conception of progress might argue along the following lines that there is. In
adopting T ′, scientists have at least learned some specific truths pertaining to T
and its failures. Scientists have learned, in particular, how some specific aspects
of T are in error by virtue of adopting T ′ that overcomes (some of) the empirical
limitations of T by virtue of appropriately diering from T . And this is a guar-
anteed form of accumulation of theoretical knowledge in the shi from T to T ′,
even if scientists are not in a position to say how T ′ is approximately true.
Although it is important to recognise accumulation in this kind of ‘Popperian’
theoretical knowledge, it is not enough to salvage the epistemic conception of
17See Malament (1986a,b) for details. ‘Relativistic eects’ are captured in terms of the light
cone geometry at each spacetime point in a solution of Einstein’s field equation as the upper
bound of particle speed goes up. The Newtonian limit is a fully ‘flaened’ light cone—as the upper
bound for particle speed goes to infinity—that is tangent to a hypersurface that represents a three-
dimensional space at a time. Throughout the limiting process spacetime structure must conform
with the dynamic constraints of GTR. As Malament (1986a) puts it: ‘The limiting process which
eects the transition from general relativity to Newtonian gravitational theory "squeezes out" all
spatial curvature!’ (406)
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progress. Even if this type of knowledge accumulation is guaranteed in theory
change, it does not seem right to think that such knowledge would ground all
the theoretical progress associated with the move from T to T ′. For intuitively
it seems that theoretical progress here at least in part has to do with what T ′
‘gets right’ about the world—how T ′ represents an improvement over T relative
to the aim of providing a good representation of unobservable reality—not with
what is known with the help of T ′ to be definitely wrong about T . The fact that
we can associate (some of) the empirical limitations of T clearly with some of
its mistaken theoretical assumptions does not seem to be all that is progressive
about adopting T ′ in the face of the evidence. Rather, some of the theoretical
progress made with T ′ intuitively has to do with the way in which T ′ latches
beer onto reality—as per TP—in a way that is responsible for its empirical suc-
cess that provides empirical support for it over T . And to have knowledge of this
would require knowledge of how the theory latches onto reality, how it is approx-
imately true. In the case of Newton, for instance, part of the theoretical progress
of NG has to do with the way in which the theory gives basically the correct field
equation for relativistic empty space, for example.18
We have found a decisive reason to deem the epistemic conception inad-
equate: scientists can make theoretical progress without accumulating know-
ledge of how their theories are beer latching onto reality. This, I will next ex-
plain, is further exacerbated by the fact that theories can latch onto reality (so as
to constitute theoretical progress) in ways that are not amenable to Bird’s move,
regardless of the epistemic limitations discussed above.
3.4 Progress with radically false theories
It is plausible that some theories can be so far o the mark, so radically false, that
in no reasonable sense can we think of them as ‘approximating’ the truth. Such
radically false theories could nevertheless exhibit theoretical progress quite un-
problematically, if an empirically beer supported theory makes beer contact
with the unobservable reality (in a way that isn’t accidental). This is readily cap-
tured by TP which takes progress to be a maer of a particular kind of improve-
ment that can be exhibited by radically false and approximately true theories
alike. The epistemic conception, on the other hand, again faces the Grounding
estion: what known truths ground this progress? If the theories in question
cannot be said to be approximately true to begin with, then one cannot make
Bird’s move and point to a knowable true proposition ‘T approximates the truth
18Harker (2013) argues that even if we cannot know whether a theory T ′ is approximately true,
we can know—and in order to be realists we must know—the approximate truth of those new
elements of T ′ the introduction of which is responsible for the empirical progress that T ′ makes
in relation to T . I fail to see how knowledge of this sort is conceptually required by realism (cf. §5
below), and I fail to see how Harker’s view can accommodate revolutionary wholesale shis in
theories, such as the one exemplified by the shi from Aristotelean mechanics to Newton’s theory.
(There’s a considerable overlap between some other aspects of Harker’s position and mine, though.)
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thus-and-so’ to capture the way these theories latch onto reality and the im-
provement therein. Perhaps Newtonian gravitation as a maer of fact is best
regarded as a radically false theory that makes theoretical progress. Bird’s move
rings hollow to those disillusioned with the extant aempts to sensibly speak of
theories such as Newton’s as ‘approximately true’.
One might argue that a theory can conceivably be radically false in this
way only if we are operating with an overly simplistic, naive, or restrictive no-
tion of approximate truth. Arguably a sophisticated and versatile account of
verisimilitude—such as the accounts developed by Niiniluoto, Kuipers, and others—
would allow us to speak of any theory’s verisimilitude to capture its ‘distance
from the truth’, even in the case of (intuitively) radically false theories.19 It might
be thought that this provides the required basis for strictly true propositions
that can function as objects of knowledge: e.g. ‘T has such-and-such degree of
verisimilitude, while T ′ has thus-and-so.’ More generally, in as far as radically
false theories can be construed as latching onto unobservable reality at all, there
will have to be corresponding true propositions that capture this. It might be
thought that the epistemic conception can capitalise on these truths as the rel-
evant objects of knowledge.
But this is not right: these truths about formal measures of verisimilitude or
the various ways in which theories latch onto unobservable reality do not allow
us to defend the epistemic conception by an extension of Bird’s move. This move
derives its initial plausibility from relatively straightforward cases like ‘planets
travel in ellipses’ in which an unproblematic, rough-and-ready conception of ap-
proximation naturally accompanies the theory in question. Contrast this with the
rarefied sense in which we can now understand, through GTR, Newton’s theory
latching onto reality. It is totally implausible that a truth about such an opaque
sense of verisimilitude—about such a qualified sense of ‘latching onto reality’—
could be epistemically accessible to scientists who make theoretical progress by
virtue of propounding a beer (even if still radically false) theory in the face of
the evidence. Therefore, even if there are truths about increasing verisimilitude in
some well-founded formal sense, or truths about how theories latch onto reality
in general, theoretical progress cannot be equated with accumulation of know-
ledge of such truths.
It is pertinent at this point to flag the importance of clarifying the sense
of improvement associated with the notion of theoretical progress. Bird (2007)
wants to exploit the key virtue of the verisimilitude account of progress by show-
ing how to move from increasing verisimilitude to the (possibility of) accumu-
lation of knowledge. (76–8) The extant verisimilitude accounts face a signific-
ant challenge, however: how to justify the equation of progress with increasing
verisimilitude? The problem is that measures of verisimilitude and judgements of
increase/decrease in verisimilitude turn out to be language dependent (e.g. Miller
19See e.g. Niiniluoto (2002), Kuipers (2000). Cevolani and Tambolo (2013) and Niiniluoto (2015)
explicitly discuss, in response to Bird, the importance of the expected verisimilitude measure.
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1975).20 Assume for the sake of the argument that relative to a particular lan-
guage our preferred formal account yields a particular degree of verisimilitude
for the old theory, and another for the new one. Assume the verisimilitude goes
up. Why exactly should this be regarded as constitutive of theoretical progress?
I will not aempt here to assess the responses made on behalf of the verisimil-
itude account. (e.g. Mormann 1988, Niiniluoto 2002) I just want to point out that
by exploiting the verisimilitude account Bird inherits this challenge: it is not clear
why knowledge of increasing verisimilitude (relative to a given language)—even if
scientists could aain such knowledge—would automatically constitute the pro-
gress made through these theories. Answering this challenge requires spelling
out a sense in which the given language-relative increase in verisimilitude rep-
resents an objective improvement in theories. In as far as a formal account of
verisimilitude can be used to precisify my vague and metaphorical notion of the-
ories ‘latching onto reality’, I obviously face the challenge likewise. I will not
consider this exact issue here. Instead, I will now address the (more general)
question I flagged above, regarding the sense of improvement we associate with
theoretical progress: what does it mean for a theory to latch beer onto reality
than another?
4 Latching (beer) onto reality
I have been arguing that one important dimension of theoretical progress has
to do with how well theories represent the unobservable world: science makes
theoretical progress if a beer confirmed theory latches beer onto reality than
its predecessor. It is high time to elucidate this hitherto worryingly metaphorical
and nebulous notion.
Capturing the way in which theories depict reality, beer or worse but prac-
tically never perfectly, is of course one of the deepest issues in the philosophy
of science. Here I can’t even begin to do justice to the enormous complexities
involved in the various aempts to capture in precise terms the way in which
theories latch onto reality. Luckily, I don’t have to. The trick is to acknowledge
that for my present purposes it is admissible to operate at a relatively high level
of abstraction, just focusing on TP and what it requires of ‘latching’ (leaving
it open how exactly this notion could be further precisified in dierent formal
frameworks, for example). In particular, what maers is that we can pin down
an objective sense in which one theory can be construed as latching beer onto
unobservable reality than another, so as to give objective meaning to theoret-
ical progress as expressed by TP. I will proceed by presenting a broad twofold
definition that guarantees objectivity and gives TP substantive enough content.
Let’s begin by stipulating a sense in which we can talk of a theory T latching
onto unobservable reality.
20Furthermore, a (prima facie) progressive theory change might also be associated with a lin-
guistic revision, as in the case of the shi from Newton to Einstein.
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T latches onto unobservable reality if and only if T ’s degree of em-
pirical adequacy is accounted for by T providing a veridical representation
of some aspects of unobservable reality.
Given this definition, we can then further stipulate that:
T ′ latches better onto unobservable reality than T if and only if T ′
is more empirically adequate than T , and the boost in empirical adequacy
is accounted for by a dierence in the respective provisions of veridical
representations.
Let’s unpack the definition of latching a bit. We have a theory T that rep-
resents the unobservable reality being, perhaps amongst (many) other things,
thus-and-so. T has a certain degree of empirical adequacy. If T ’s empirical ad-
equacy is accounted for by the reality really being thus-and-so, then we say that
T latches onto reality, period. Never mind if we are not in a position to provide
an account of T’s empirical adequacy in these terms. Never mind if the scient-
ists upholding T cannot see how the theory thus latches onto reality; they oen
cannot, lacking a true theory to compare T with. Never mind what ‘proportion’
or ‘part’ of T ’s representational content is involved in accounting for its empir-
ical adequacy; sometimes T ‘says’ many irrelevant things about the reality be-
hind a phenomenon (as in the case of some of the 19th c. ether theories). Never
mind that latching does not aim to capture any kind of ‘overall correspondence’
between a theoretical representation and reality, but rather is relative to T ’s em-
pirical adequacy. Never mind that there may not be any obvious, straightforward
connection between how T represents the unobservable world, on the one hand,
and what accounts for its empirical adequacy, on the other.21
With this definition in hand, latching better is then just a maer of latching
onto reality and being more empirically adequate. Since the respective degrees
of empirical adequacy of T and T ′ is accounted for by them providing a veridical
representation of some aspects of unobservable reality, the increase in empirical
adequacy is also accounted for by dierences in the respective accounts of em-
pirical adequacy. The boost in empirical adequacy can be due to various kinds of
theoretical improvements. For example, it can be due to T ′ providing a veridical
representation of further pertinent aspects of reality (e.g. additional mechanistic
detail). Or, it can be due to T ′ providing a more fine-grained representation of
the same aspects of reality (e.g. by incorporating additional variables to quantify
21A toy example: One is theorising about an unobservable (neural, say) network with 11 nodes.
Assume that a certain feature of the network only depends on the number of nodes being a prime
number between 10-20, and that this feature is revealed through a phenomenon the prediction of
which depends on latching onto the primality of nodes. With respect to this phenomenonT19 nodes
latches onto reality, while T12 nodes does not. This is not going to be at all obvious to anyone
ignorant of the significance of primality. For example, one might well take the predictive success
of T19 nodes over T12 nodes as an indicator of T19 nodes geing the number of nodes almost right.
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fluctuations at a shorter time-scale). Whatever the details, at the boom latch-
ing better is just a maer of T ′ being more empirically adequate by virtue of
latching onto reality in a way that also accounts for the boost in empirical ad-
equacy.
Latching (better) onto reality is a notion intimately connected to the ex-
planationist realist agenda. In particular, the realist’s basic motivation, articu-
lated in the ‘no-miracles’ argument, turns on the intuition that predictive success
(suitably construed) would be extremely unlikely, or diicult to explain, unless
theories were latching onto unobservable reality in ways that accounts for the
success. The no-miracles intuition, and the dierent arguments that capitalize
on it, say lile about what kinds of theory/world relations satisfy the explanat-
ory request at stake. With this in mind, the notion of latching (better) onto
reality is defined in broad terms, to capture all (and only) the gist of the no-
miracles intuition. In particular, it is meant to be compatible with various forms
of scientific realism that are all in the business of accounting (in realist terms)
the empirical success of false past theories from our current perspective. Dif-
ferent realists can oer dierent, more precise definitions that take a stand on
exactly what kind of representational adequacy can account for a theory’s degree
of empirical adequacy (in a way that satisfies the realist intuitions and doesn’t
give the game away to the anti-realist). The advocates of structural realism, for
example, claim that the empirical success of past theories can be accounted for in
terms of these theories providing a veridical representation of critical structural
aspects of reality.22 A related but subtly dierent position claims that the empir-
ical success of past theories is (sometimes) best accounted for in terms of these
theories providing a veridical representation of critical less specific properties.
(Saatsi, 2005) Both realist positions are commied to the claim that the degree of
empirical adequacy enjoyed by Fresnel’s optical ether theory, for example, can be
accounted for in terms of Fresnel’s theorising latching onto reality. Similarly, the
boost in empirical adequacy achieved by classical electrodynamics—itself a false
theory as a classical (non-quantum) theory—can arguably be accounted for in
terms of the theory latching beer onto reality. These dierent realist positions
all claim that there is an unambiguous sense of theoretical progress from Fresnel
to Maxwell to Feynman; the disagreement is mainly about how to best capture
the specific sense in which these theories are progressively latching onto reality.
This progress is captured by TP regardless of one’s specific realist prefer-
ences.23 According to the realists Fresnel made theoretical progress, for example,
since his theoretical assumptions latched onto reality beer than those of his pre-
22There are various dierences amongst the structural realists. For a review, see Frigg and Votsis
(2011)
23TP is also meant to be compatible with pluralism regarding dierent philosophical, meta-
scientific frameworks that can be used to capture ‘latching onto’ in more specific terms. These
include, for example, (i) the similarity approach (e.g. Giere 1988, Teller 2001); (ii) the partial iso-
morphism approach (e.g. da Costa and French 2003); (iii) the mathematico-logical structure ap-
proach (Worrall 2007).
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decessors. Fresnel’s progress does not boil down to Fresnel knowing—or having
the possibility of knowing ‘had suitable epistemic conditions been met’ (cf. Bird
2007: 76))—truths about what light really is like and why it really behaves the
way it does. Fresnel made theoretical progress even if Laudan (1981) is right in
claiming that there is no sense in which Fresnel’s theory can be considered ‘ap-
proximately true’, and even if Fresnel was in no position to formulate—never mind
know—relevant truths of the sort ‘approximately, light is such-and-such waving
of the ether’.
There’s obviously much to be said about how the fact that a theory provides
a veridical representation of some features of unobservable reality accounts for
the theory’s empirical adequacy. The realist notion that only some ‘parts’ or ‘as-
pects’ of a theory can be selectively responsible for (and account for) its predictive
success is delicate, but it is commonly accepted that the realist has to appeal to
such a notion in order to square the impressive predictive success of science with
various kinds of falsehoods involved in the past and present science. I have noth-
ing further to add here to the extant aempts to get to grips with this notion,
except to note again that scientists working on inter-theory relations could oen
be viewed as directly contributing to these aempts; the task isn’t just a concep-
tual one for philosophers to sort out—it is part and parcel of theoretical science
itself! Although there is further work to be done here, I share the realist optim-
ism that sense can be made of the idea that, for example, only a relatively small
subset of Augustine Fresnel’s theoretical assumptions regarding the optical ether
enter into a realist explanation of Fresnel’s predictive successes.
5 Realism and progress
There is an intimate conceptual ainity between scientific realism and theoretical
progress, and the foregoing analysis of the laer has significant repercussions
regarding our understanding of realism.
It is natural to understand scientific realism as being commied, at the min-
imum, to the claim that science as a maer of fact makes theoretical progress.24
This is also how Bird (2007) understands realism, but he of course frames it in
epistemic terms, in terms of knowledge of the unobservable.
[Realism can be taken to claim] that there has been progress in regard of
our knowledge of theoretical propositions concerning the unobservable.25
(79)
Most commentators have likewise associated realism with growing scientific know-
ledge. For example, in a recent review of scientific realism, Chakravary (2011)
expounds:
24This is part of the motivation for defining ‘theoretical progress’ as extra-empirical, extra-
instrumental, extra-pragmatic (cf. §1)
25Bird also considers the broader realist thesis that ‘science has always progressed’, but as he
notes, this is compatible with anti-realist positions like constructive empiricism.
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Most commonly [realism] is described in terms of the epistemic achieve-
ments constituted by scientific theories . . .What all of approaches [to de-
fining realism] have in common is a commitment to the idea that our best
theories have a certain epistemic status: they yield knowledge of aspects of
the world, including unobservable aspects. (my emphasis)
Conceptualising realism thus in terms of accumulation of knowledge is ex-
tremely widespread. We could call it the standard conception. Its popularity is
not surprising; admiedly it is natural and intuitive to equate realism with the
idea that scientists constantly learn new facts about the unobservable world. But
natural though this equation is, it is again too simple. For it is also natural to
think of realism just in terms of theoretical progress of science, and we have seen
that there is a dimension of theoretical progress that has to do with the way
in which theories latch onto reality that cannot always be captured in terms of
accumulation of scientific knowledge. Corresponding to this further dimension
of progress there is an epistemologically weaker realist claim: theories actually
latch onto reality beer and beer so as to drive our theories’ increasing empirical
adequacy.
This conception of realism is more minimal than the standard conception.26 It
is not meant to replace the standard conception, but rather to extend or comple-
ment it. The complement maers, because the standard conception fails to fully
capture the theoretical progress (conceivably) made by some of the most funda-
mental scientific theories and the appropriate epistemic commitments towards
those theories.27
Newtonian gravity is again a case in point. What kind of realist commit-
ment towards Newtonian mechanics would not have been countered by the sub-
sequent scientific developments? According to the standard conception, the real-
ist is commied solely to the idea that Newton’s theory yields knowledge of some
unobservable aspects of reality. But what kind of knowledge of the unobservable
26More precisely, it is a more minimal conception of theory-realism. There are more minimal
forms of entity realism, for example, which lie outside the scope of this paper. Some also regard
as realism some declarations of knowledge of certain systematic counterfactual truths regarding
observable maers. For example, Northco (2013) discusses scientific progress in light of such
conception of ‘causal verisimilitude’, and Harper (2013) discusses in great detail the progress made
by Newton by these lights. Woodward (2003) calls such position ‘instrumental realism’. It is a
maer of debate to what extent those declarations and the associated accumulation of knowledge
transcend constructive empiricism in any substantial way. (Cf. Hugge’s (2013) review of Harper.)
27Cf. Barre (2008):
‘If the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics and relativity are al-
most certainly false taken together and if, since we do not know how to fix them, we
do not know the sense in which they can be taken to be approximately true, then
in what sense do our current best physical theories provide physical knowledge?’
(215)
Barre’s response is to capture our current commitments and knowledge in terms of imprecise
‘descriptive nesting relations’ that can only be made precise from a later vantage point. Barre’s
view is closely related to my sense of theories latching onto reality. See also Rohrlich and Hardin
(2003).
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could Newton and his contemporaries possibly have had? All the ontological
presuppositions of Newton’s theoretical framework are simply false: there is no
gravitational force, no spacetime ‘background’ relative to which things move, no
absolute simultaneity. And the Newtonians could not have known the subtle
sense in which we can now grasp Newton’s theory as having latched onto reality
as described by Einstein’s general relativity.
A case in point, indeed, but a case against realism, cries the anti-realist! Not
only is the key theoretical term ‘gravitational force’ seemingly non-referring, but
in as far as we may occupy a similar epistemic predicament regarding our current
fundamental theories, arguably even structural realism is bankrupt since ‘we will
not know what [structural] aspects of current theories are the ones we can safely
regard as accurately describing features of the natural world.’ (Stanford 2003:
570, my emphasis)
The anti-realist must concede that some new truths about the unobservable
world were correctly believed by (or epistemically accessible to) the Newtoni-
ans.28 But she may insist that the knowledge grounded in these truths is neg-
ligible in the face of the overall dialectic of the realism debate. In as far as the
realist is driven by some kind of no-miracles intuition regarding novel predictive
successes and the theory’s overall empirical adequacy, what maers is that the
realist commitments are geared towards accounting for these successes. And it
is not at all clear—the anti-realist presses—that Newton’s actual and potential
knowledge gains can do that. For example, the fact that Newton learned that
tidal and planetary phenomena are of the same, gravitational origin—without
knowing what that origin actually is—can hardly account for the overall predict-
ive accuracy of the theory or for Newton’s novel prediction that Earth is such-
and-such an oblate spheroid. And arguably the rich modal knowledge gained by
Newton does lile beyond summarising (one aspect of) the ‘miracle’ of the no-
miracles intuition: that the theory is empirically very accurate with respect to a
huge range of actual and possible configurations of massive bodies.
The anti-realist reaction is a step too far, however. Realist commitments need
not be concerned with ‘first-order’ scientific knowledge about this or that unob-
servable feature of the natural world, as suggested by the standard conception of
realism. As a global aitude towards science, realism can merely be commied to
our fundamental theories making theoretical progress by virtue of suitably latch-
ing onto reality. (See Saatsi 2016.) And arguably Newton’s theory did latch onto
unobservable reality in complicated and highly non-trivial ways that account for
the theory’s empirical accuracy, but in ways that we can only appreciate and
study from later vantage points, by studying its inter-theoretic relationship to
general relativity, for example. (Malament 1986a,b; Malament 2012) Our current
vantage point need not be privileged in any way, either as ‘a final theory’, or
28Newton gained knowledge of the fact that projectile and tidal phenomena are ultimately of
the same origin, for example. More generally, Newton gained knowledge of remarkable systems
of fine-grained counterfactual truths that count as causal truths in some prominent accounts of
causation. (Harper 2011, Woodward 2003). See also footnote 26.
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as a theory that we know to be approximately true in some specific sense. But
come what may, if science actually makes theoretical progress in a way a sensible
realist believes it does, then we will always be able to account for past theories’
increasing empirical adequacy, with hindsight as it were, in these terms.
Such minimal realism is still an epistemological aitude, of course, but its
key knowledge claim about the world is somewhat indirect: what we know of
the unobservable reality, says the realist, is that our theory is latching onto it—in
the sense explicated above (§4). We can further precisify this global realist at-
titude locally, with particular exemplars, perhaps also taking into account one’s
preferences for a specific meta-scientific framework to analyse theory-world rela-
tionships. This belief concerns squarely the unobservable, and it transcends mere
instrumentalist and empiricist commitments regarding the observable, typically
cashed out in terms of increasing empirical adequacy and the representational
faithfulness of theories’ empirical sub-structures. (See Saatsi 2015 for related dis-
cussion.) Along with the realist position comes also a commitment to try to figure
out the ways in which theories are thus latching onto reality, so that future the-
orising can latch onto reality even beer. For the realist scientists’ employment
and research into various kinds of ‘correspondence rules’ is not just a maer of
pragmatics!29
Delineating such a minimal realist position is one thing, defending it is an-
other. I will not aempt to construct or assess a positive case for realism here.
Rather, I have been concerned with the ground work: geing clear on what real-
ism could be. This ground work is significant in clarifying some of the miscon-
ceptions in the current literature. For example, at the heart of Stanford’s (2003)
forceful critique of realism is the worry that contemporary scientists cannot trust
their current theories to give them knowledge—this is Stanford’s trust argument.
As far as I can judge, the main advocates of structural realism, for instance, have
not commied (and need not commit) themselves to the kind of epistemic trust
that Stanford takes to be constitutive of realism. The right way to understand
structural realism, I propose, is as a form of minimal realism.
6 Further dimensions of theoretical progress?
Progress, in general, is a result-oriented, evaluative concept that applies to a pos-
itive achievement. This concept is so open-ended that it is reasonable to expect
scientific progress to frustrate aempts to fully capture it in universal terms. The
epistemic conception oers such a universal, one-size-fits-all account of scientific
progress.30 I have argued that there is a dimension of theoretical progress that
doesn’t fit this conception. Accumulation of knowledge is one important dimen-
29See Hartmann (2002) for dierent kinds of correspondence principles operating in science, and
Rohrlich and Hardin (1983) for application to realism.
30Northco (2013) oers dierent one-size-fits-all account, in terms of increasing causal
verisimilitude.
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sion of scientific progress, for sure. The way in which theories latch beer and
beer onto unobservable reality is another. Are there yet further dimensions?
I think so. My discussion of TP has focused on the way in which ‘latching
onto reality’ can be cashed out in terms of a theory’s representational veridicality
accounting for its empirical accuracy. This was inspired by the fact that all (the-
ory) realists are in one way or another commied to accounting for a theory’s
predictive accuracy. But there are other aspects of ‘empirical success’ a realist
could also be commied to. For example, one might focus instead on improved
theoretical understanding as (a dimension of) theoretical progress.31
Shiing the focus from prediction to understanding and explanation raises
diicult issues that I leave gladly for later work. As a precursory note, however,
I wish to briefly comment on Bird’s aempt to incorporate understanding into
the epistemic conception of progress.
[W]hile the importance of understanding is clear, that does not contrast
with the aim of knowledge, because all (genuine as opposed to apparent)
understanding is also knowledge. To understand why something occurred
is to know what causes, processes, or laws brought it about. (84)
Conceptualising scientific understanding in these terms is widespread.32 But
there’s room to resist this equation of increased understanding with accumu-
lating knowledge (of laws, causation, processes); increase in understanding can
plausibly transcend accumulation of knowledge in interesting ways. Consider
explanatory idealisations, for example. It is a striking fact that by incorporating
idealisations science can sometimes improve our understanding despite taking us
away from the truth (e.g. Elgin 2004, 2007). Bird’s move, by a natural extension,
would admit that these idealisations involve felicitous approximations, but main-
tain that theoretical progress qua increased understanding is underwrien by
knowable truths of the form ‘approximately P ’. But it is not at all clear whether
this move can be sustained. The problem is that scientists have been seemingly
able to obtain progress-inducing understanding from idealisations without hav-
ing knowledge of the sense of ‘approximation’ at play.
Take, for instance, our understanding of the phenomena captured by the ideal
gas law. A standard textbook explanation of the ideal gas law conveys an import-
ant part of that understanding by representing gas molecules as point particles
that never collide with one another and only bump the container walls. This
is quite a radical idealisation, since intermolecular collisions are actually rather
frequent. Did the ideal gas model convey understanding only when scientists
grasped the way in which the model relates to reality and why it furnishes an
explanatory derivation of the ideal gas law despite its radically idealised assump-
tions? A contestable claim, to say the least.
31See also Rowboom (2015) for related remarks.
32E.g. Lipton (2004: 30): ‘Understanding is not some sort of super-knowledge, but simply more
knowledge: knowledge of causes.’
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Some prominent cases of explanatory idealisation involve more radical false-
hoods that are even less amenable to Bird’s move (see e.g. Baerman 2002, Boku-
lich 2008, Rice 2013). Although the explanatory contribution of these idealisations
(involving e.g. asymptotic limits) is a maer considerable debate, some clearly
take them to support Elgin’s claim about the non-factivity of understanding, ac-
cording to which the full cognitive contribution to theoretical understanding can-
not be captured by truths alone (2004, 2007).33 On the face of it, the epistemic
conception of progress appears too simple in this dimension as well.
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